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stock. There is less crowd-out in more populous markets, and more crowd-out in places where there is less
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Do Low Income Housing Subsidies Increase the Occupied Housing Stock? 
ABSTRACT 
A necessary condition for justifying a policy such as subsidized low-income housing, 
either via tenant-based rental assistance or construction of public or private projects, is that it has 
a real effect on market outcomes. In this paper, we examine one aspect of the real effect of 
subsidized housing- does it increase the housing stock? If subsidized housing raises the 
quantity of occupied housing per capita, either more people are finding housing or they are being 
housed less densely. On the other hand, if subsidized housing merely crowds out equiv alent-
quality low-income housing that otherwise would have been provided by the private sector, the 
housing policy may have little real effect on housing consumption. Using both Census place and 
MSA-lev el data from the decennial census and from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, we ask whether housing markets with more subsidized housing also have more 
total housing, after accounting for housing demand. We fmd that government-financed units 
raise the total number of units in a market, although on average one government-subsidized unit 
adds only one-third to one-half of a unit to the total housing stock. There is less crowd-out in 
more populous markets, and more crowd out in places where there is less excess demand for 
subsidized housing, as measured by the number of government-financed units per eligible 
person. Tenant-based housing programs, such as Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers, seem to 
be more effective than project-based programs at targeting subsidized housing units to people 
who otherwise would not have their own. 
JEL Codes: H42, R21, R31 
Through various levels of government, the U.S. spends a considerable sum subsidizing 
low-income housing, over $25 billion in budget outlays on an annualized basis. 1 These subsidies 
include both project-based programs such as public housing and Section 8 New Construction 
and tenant-based voucher programs, such as Section 8 existing housing assistance, that aim to 
shoulder a portion of the cost of priv ately provided housing. The implicit rationale underlying 
both project and tenant-based programs, which we refer to collectively as "subsidized housing," 
is that, in the absence of government intervention, poor people would consume inadequate 
amounts of housing. 2 
In spite ofthe large expenditures on these programs, it is far from obvious if they have 
any effect on whether families have their own housing units (as opposed to sharing a unit with 
another family or being homeless). It is possible, instead, that these programs simply transfer 
resources to families that would be housed ev en in the programs' absence. If so, one might 
regard the programs as wasteful and ineffectual, although such a conclusion would not 
necessarily follow as subsidies might allow households to occupy better housing units. In this 
paper we ask whether low-income housing subsidies satisfy a simple sufficient condition for 
effectuality: do they increase the number of families housed in their own units or do they simply 
crowd-out priv ately-provided low-income housing? In particular, if subsidized housing raises 
the quantity of occupied housing units per capita, either more people are finding housing or they 
are being housed less densely. 
Using cross-sectional data on total housing, subsidized housing, and population (and 
other demand shifters) in 22,872 Census designated places - and 252 MSAs - we find neither 
1 HUD outlays alone reached roughly $25 billion per year in the mid-1990s. The amount is much larger if one also 
includes USDA programs accounting for over 20 percent of subsidized units and the tax expenditure for the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, which costs about $3 billion per year (see Olsen, 2001). 
2 See Olsen (2001) for a clear discussion of the possible rationales for subsidizing housing expenditure. 
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complete crowd out, nor that subsidized housing is all net new. We estimate that an additional 
subsidized unit raises the total number of units in a place or MSA by between 0.35 and 0.52 
units. Lending credibility to the estimates, we find that crowd out is smaller in markets with 
more excess demand for the existing subsidized housing stock, measured as the number of 
families potentially eligible for subsidized housing per existing subsidized unit. 
The impact of subsidized housing on the long-run housing stock depends on the way that 
the housing is allocated to families. If a unit in a public or private subsidized project, or a 
voucher for use toward a privately supplied unit, is awarded to a family that currently boards free 
of charge with another family and would otherwise not have purchased its own housing services, 
then the unit will be a net addition to housing consumed and no crowd out will occur. 
Remaining demand for private housing will not decline and in the case of a v oucher an 
additional private unit will be built to replace the one rented by the subsidized family, presuming 
the long run supply of low income housing is elastic. On the other hand, if the subsidized unit is 
awarded to a family that would have purchased some housing services in the absence of the 
program, then the program may have little effect on the quantity of housing consumed. Indeed, 
consistent with their reported goals, tenant-based programs seem to be doing a better job of 
targeting families who would not otherwise consume their own unit. An additional housing unit 
provided through this mechanism yields 0. 7 units of net new housing while project-based 
housing generates less than 0.3 units of net new housing. If the goal of low-income housing 
programs is to house families that would otherwise not have their own units, then resources 
should be targeted to places with more eligible families relative to the existing stock of 
government-financed units or distributed through programs with sufficient flexibility to allocate 
the subsidies to the neediest families. 
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Our inquiry is related to two strands of existing research. First, this is one of many 
studies of whether government programs crowd out private activity. Other recent studies on this 
basic topic include Cutler and Gruber (1996), on whether public insurance crowds out private 
insurance, and Berry and Waldfogel (1999), on whether public radio broadcasting crowds out 
commercial broadcasting.3 Two studies by Murray (1983, 1999) examine how subsidized 
housing crowd outs housing construction and the private housing stock.4 Murray (1983) asks 
whether public housing crowds out private housing using time series regressions of private 
housing starts on public housing starts. The relationship between public and private starts does 
not illuminate the equilibrium relationship between public housing subsidies and the stock of 
private housing. Closer to our question, Murray (1999) estimates a vector autoregression on 27 
years of the stock of subsidized and private housing units. He concludes that public housing 
units added to the total housing stock but that moderate income subsidies did not. By contrast, 
we take a cross sectional approach with a large number of observations. The focus of our study 
is instead on market-level equilibrium. Using cross sectional data that we presume describe a 
long-run equilibrium, we ask how the equilibrium in the private housing market responds to the 
extent of subsidized housing in a market. 5 
The second strand of research relating to this study is the literature on the effect of 
subsidized housing on homelessness. Early ( 1998) finds that existing subsidized housing has not 
targeted those most at risk of homelessness and that its expansion would not clearly reduce 
3 Government crowding out of private activity is a fairly generic phenomenon. Major additional contexts include 
Social Security and private saving (Feldstein, 1982) and program expenditure and charitable giving (Kingma, 
1989), to name a few. 
4Susin (2002) finds that rent vouchers lead to substantially higher rents for unsubsidized low-income units. He 
attributes this result to higher voucher-driven demand in the low-income segment of the housing market combined 
with a low elasticity of supply of such housing. However, it is not clear that the supply elasticity in the low-income 
market is inelastic. [DiPasquale (1999)] 
5 Since it takes some time for the private housing market to fully respond, we believe an equilibrium analysis, rather 
than a time series analysis, is most appropriate. 
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homelessness. Early & Olsen (2002) find that housing subsidies targeting very poor households 
have large and significant effects on homelessness. 
This paper proceeds in four sections. First, we rev iew the basic low-income housing 
subsidies and lay out a simple framework for analyzing their effect. Second, we describe the 
data used in the study. Third, we present evidence on the impact of subsidized housing on 
overall housing consumption. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. Background and Mechanisms 
1. Market Mechanism 
Housing subsidy programs fall into two basic categories: project-based and tenant-based. 
Project-based programs, such as public housing and Section 236, use government funding to 
supply housing units. Tenant-based programs, such as the Section 8 certificate and voucher 
program, give recipients a form of assistance to pay for some or all of the rent for a private unit. 
While in many ways quite different, these programs share the essential feature that program 
administrators ration access to the program's housing. That is, certain criteria must be met to be 
eligible for subsidized housing, but not all eligible families receive subsidized housing, and the 
most poorly housed families do not necessarily receive priority for subsidized housing. The key 
question for how both programs affect housing market equilibrium is whether the families 
awarded housing under the programs would have dwelt in their own units in the absence ofthe 
programs. 
Subsidized housing, even proj ect-based housing, is not necessarily free housing. A 
family that meets the eligibility criteria still needs to pay some rent, with an amount typically 
defined as a percent of family income. The primary programs through which HUD provides 
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subsidized housing all require such a tenant contribution.6 The first program is Public and Indian 
Housing. Since 1937, HUD has paid the construction costs, and more recently the operating 
costs not covered by tenant rents, of public housing projects run by Public Housing Authorities 
(PHAs) or Indian Housing Authorities (IHAs). Tenants currently are required to pay 30 percent 
of their incomes as rent. 
Section 8 new construction and rehabilitation, in place from 1974 to 1983, subsidized 
private developers to build new housing or convert existing buildings into low-income housing. 
In addition, tenants' rent was subsidized by HUD with HUD covering the differential in rents 
between what the tenant is required to pay and the fair market rent in the area. 7 As of 1983, no 
additional units were funded under this program, though funding was continued for existing 
obligations. 8 
Over the last two decades, low income housing policy has shifted from government 
subsidization of project-based housing construction (such as public housing) toward a reliance 
on tenant-based assistance, such as certificates and vouchers. 9 Project-based housing in the US 
was constructed mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. As Poterba (1994) documents, new project-
based housing starts slowed from 24,000 units in 1980 to a trickle in the late 1980s (2,000 to 
3,000 per year during 1985-1987). Project-based assistance continues to comprise the majority 
of subsidized housing units, but the growth in tenant-based assistance has been much more rapid. 
From tables in Olsen (2001) we compute that the tenant-based share of subsidized units rose 
6 See Olsen (2001) and Quigley (2000) for excellent descriptions of the institutional details and history of public 
housing. 
7 
"Fair market rent" is defined by HUD for each geographical area. 
8 Olsen (2001) reports that prior funded construction continued for more than a decade. 
9 There is one big exception to this statement: the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit provides a tax subsidy to private 
developers if they make their units available to a sufficient number oflow-income families. The LIHTC is the 
second largest and most rapidly growing low-income h ousing program in the U.S., already housing about 1.3 
million families. [Olsen (2003)] 
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from 8 percent in 1976 to about 25 percent in the early 1990s, where it held steady through 1998, 
the end of Olsen's data. 10 
The Section 8 Housing Assistance Program was HUD's tenant-based assistance program 
during our sample period. Eligible participants received either certificates or vouchers good for, 
at best, the difference between HUD 's assessment of fair market rent and 30 percent of their 
income. Under the certificate program, the tenants must have located a unit that met minimum 
quality standards and did not rent for more than the fair market rent. They paid their share and 
the HUD certificate covered the remainder. The voucher program did not place a cap on the 
market rent of the unit. The tenants simply received a voucher for the difference between the 
fair market rent and the tenant's contribution; if the tenant chose to rent a more expensive unit 
they could pay the difference out of pocket. If they chose a less expensive unit, their 
contribution was reduced. 
Table 1 provides a summary ofthe size of various programs targeted at low-income 
renting families in 1996. A total of eight basic programs provided 4. 81 million housing units, or 
4.2 percent ofthe nearly 116 million housing units in the U.S. 11 By far the largest programs are 
Section 8 Certificates & Vouchers (1.35 million units) and Public Housing (1.33 million units). 
The Section 8 New & Substantial Rehabilitation program provides 0.90 million units. Other 
subsidized construction programs include Section 236 (0.45 million units), the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (0.33 million units), Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation (0.11 million units), 
Indian Housing (0.07 million units) and miscellaneous other programs providing a total of0.29 
million units. 
10 These figures treat Low-Income Housing Tax Credit fnnding commitments as actual nnits available for 
occupancy. In reality, this overestimates the availability of LIHTC nnits and thus nnderestimates the tenant-based 
share of subsidized housing. 
11 Source: "Census 2000 Quickfacts," http://quickfacts.census.gov/hnnits. 
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To receive a subsidized unit, one must satisfy a fairly complicated set of eligibility 
criteria and also be selected from within the pool of eligible applicants. The primary restriction 
on eligibility is income. A family of four can earn no more than 80 percent of their area's 
median income to be eligible.12 During our sample period, Congress had enacted preferences for 
' 'very low income" families : to be so classified, a family of four must have an income less than 
50 percent of the median. 13 Choosing which families from the large pool of eligibles would 
receive subsidized housing is up to each of the approximately 3400 local housing authorities. 14 
During our sample period, preference was typically given to the elderly, people living in 
"substandard" housing, and those paying more than 50 percent oftheir income as rent. [Olsen 
(2001)]15 
2. Market Effects 
One might expect that programs that directly increase the supply of housing (such as 
public and Indian housing, as well as some parts of Section 8) would affect the housing market 
differently than programs such as Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers that operate on the 
demand side. Yet, all of these programs share an important feature: administrators choose how 
to allocate housing to eligibles, leaving the remainder of the (private) market to equilibrate. 16 
The process of allocating housing units (or vouchers, as we shall see below) provides the 
demand management that determines the equilibrium impact of the program. 
12 This cap varies with family size. 
13 In addition there are now some preferences for families with incomes below 30 percent of the median, though 
these rules were not in effect during the time period covered by our data. 
14 Similarly, the owners of privately subsidized projects select their tenants. 
15 Some of these preferences were eliminated in the Housing Act of 1998. 
16 For the purpose of this exposition, it is easiest to view privately owned units that are rented using Section 8 
certificates or vouchers as publicly supplied housing. One can view the future stream of Section 8 payments that the 
landlord will receive as the means by which the housing is purchased for the virtual public stock. 
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It is instructive to consider the effects ofthe two basic kinds of housing programs using 
simple supply and demand analysis. We rrrst consider subsidized project-based housing. 
Project-based units are public supply. 17 When they are built they shift aggregate housing supply 
out. If prices adjust so that markets clear, then the number of units consumed will initially rise 
by the number of project-based units made available. How the project units are allocated, 
however, determines whether in the long run they raise housing consumption. To begin with one 
extreme, suppose that each new project-based housing unit is allocated to a family that was 
formerly unable to purchase housing and was living rent-free with another family. Then the 
subsidized housing policy provides both new demand and new supply.18 The unit occupied by 
the recipient family represents a transaction that would otherwise not have occurred. This 
transaction, however, has no effect on the private market. Because the family would not hav e 
purchased housing in the private market, private demand for units is not reduced. 19 Because the 
new supply is rationed only to families with no priv ate demand, the public supply has no effect 
on the private market. Put another way, the project-based unit would raise the total housing stock 
by one unit. No crowd out would occur. 
At the other extreme, had the subsidized unit been given to an inframarginal family - one 
purchasing its own private housing unit without the program, the program would reduce demand 
for private housing. With such an allocation scheme, the equilibrium impact of the project-based 
housing unit would be a reduction by one in the number of private units. Put another way, the 
17 Almost all project-based assistance is used to develop new units, either through subsidized construction or maj or 
rehabilitation. 
18 That is, the recipient enjoys an income transfer in the form of in-kind rent, which raises demand. 
19 Although the rent-paying family that remains may wish to reduce its consumption of space since its roommates 
moved out, it still needs a unit. 
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subsidized housing unit would not raise the number of units in the housing stock. Crowd out 
would be complete. 20 
A possible middle ground would occur if the new recipient of subsidized housing 
contributes some but not all of the rent. That family moves into new housing, leaving behind a 
family that now cannot afford their unit by themselv es. However, they now can pair up with 
another family who is no longer sharing its unit, leading to the abandonment of one private unit 
In this example, for every four families that were occupying two units, an allocation of one unit 
of subsidized housing to each pair would lead to three occupied units in the end, a net addition of 
one or equivalently 50 percent crowd-out. 
While voucher programs do not directly lead to the construction of additional units, their 
potential effect on demand is the same. A certificate or voucher can be awarded to a family that 
would have purchased private housing in the absence ofthe program, or it can be awarded to a 
family that would not have purchased such housing. In the former case, demand for housing 
where landlords do not accept vouchers falls by the number of voucher units allocated. 
Vouchers do not raise the number of units in the stock, and crowd out is complete. In the latter 
case, demand for non-voucher housing is unaffected. In the long run vouchers provide new 
demand, and the priv ate market responds with additional private units. Again, a middle ground 
of partial crowd-out is also possible. 
Thus far, our exposition has assumed that the long run supply of privately-provided low 
income housing is perfectly elastic and thus the quantity of low-income housing adjusts to public 
subsidies but not the price. If the housing supply curve is upward-sloping in the long run, 
20 In the short nm, constructing subsidized housing units would increase the aggregate housing supply in a market. 
However, the resulting lower house prices would lead to fewer additional units being constructed than otherwise 
would have. If the subsidized housing units were of a higher quality than the private housing they displaced, the 
overall quality oflow income housing could increase without any apparent change in the number of units. 
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presumably due to an inelastic supply of land or other inputs, the degree of crowd out when 
measured in terms of units would be larger. A newly constructed subsidized unit allocated to a 
family not already consuming a unit would lead to higher land prices and thus rents in the long 
run. At those higher rents, private housing demand would decline, partially offsetting some of 
the increase in housing stock. 
In the short run, if there are useable vacant units in the market, housing supply is very 
inelastic since the stock of existing housing does not quickly disappear. [Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2001)] In that case, the degree of crowd out may differ between subsidies for new construction 
and existing housing. If low income housing subsidies lead to new units being built, the supply 
of housing will increase without a commensurate rise in demand. The tenants who move into the 
newly constructed subsidized housing will reduce demand for the inelastically supplied private 
housing stock, lowering rents. At those lower rents, demand for private units may increase, 
leading to more than a one-for-one increase in total units. But if vacant private units are 
purchased for the subsidized stock, as with vouchers, the overhang of private vacant units will be 
reduced, leading to a rise in private market rents. 
Although the empirical ev idence is mixed, most surveys of the general housing supply 
literature conclude that the supply of housing units is fairly price elastic, at least on a national 
level. [DiPasquale (1999), Olsen (1987), Whitehead (1999)] In contrast, recent research [Susin 
(2002)] presents evidence that the long-run housing supply elasticity is low. While we cannot 
resolve the housing supply elasticity question in this paper, two points are in order. First, the 
possibility of inelastic supply shrinks the possible effect of subsidies on housing consumption 
and thus makes any effect more difficult to identify. Second, a low supply elasticity implies that 
housing consumption should respond differentially to tenant and project-based subsidized 
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housing. If supply is inelastic, then voucher policies which directly stimulate only demand 
should have smaller effects on quantity than project-based housing programs which (unless they 
are accompanied by demolition) stimulate both supply and demand. As we will see in the 
empirical section, tenant-based housing has a bigger effect on the consumption of units than 
project-based housing, consistent with relatively elastic long run supply. 
Our schematic description leaves out a few important features of the housing market 
First, we are focusing on units. Even if a subsidized housing program has no effect on the 
number of units in the stock, it may affect the quality of units consumed. Second, a subsidized 
housing program may affect where recipients choose to live in potentially beneficial ways. [Katz 
et al (200 1)] Finally, we are abstracting from the income transfer portion of the program. Rent 
subsidies, even to people who would have rented their own unit in the absence of the program, is 
one way of transferring income to the needy. Subsidized housing may provide a way for 
families with high rent burdens to reduce the proportion of their incomes they devote to housing, 
even if they are already housed. In addition, if subsidized housing is sufficiently stigmatized it 
may be an optimal way of identifying valid recipients of public assistance. [Nichols and 
Zeckhauser (1982)] 
II. Data 
The ideal unit of observation for our study would be a market area. That is, we are trying 
to ascertain the impact of subsidized housing on total housing. A narrow geographic unit, for 
example a census tract, would be inappropriate as a unit of observation for our study because the 
private housing built in the adjustment to the new equilibrium following the introduction of 
subsidized housing would likely be outside the tract. It is not obvious what level of geography 
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corresponds to the housing market, so we employ two approaches. First, we employ a cross 
section of 22,872 Census designated places. Places are political units such as cities and towns. 21 
Places would be an adequate unit of observation if private market adjustment to the low-income 
housing programs occurred inside of the political jurisdictions where the subsidized housing is 
located. Yet small places, such as suburbs of large metropolitan areas, may be components of 
larger metropolitan housing markets. If subsidized housing attracts eligibles to places, then 
estimates using places may overstate the stimulating effect of subsidized housing on the overall 
housing stock. To deal with this we also employ a second approach, using the 252 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) as our observations on markets. Since MSAs are designed to 
encompass an economic area rather than a purely geographic one, we suspect that MSAs fully 
contain housing markets while small Census places may not. On the other hand, aggregating to 
just 252 MSAs masks much of the v ariation we might use to identify our effects. 
Our basic cross section matches data on total housing stock, population, and other 
demand determinants in each Census place and MSA from the 1990 decennial Census with data 
on the number of subsidized housing units, also by Census place and MSA, for 1996 from 
HUD's "A Picture of Subsidized Households- 1996." The HUD data set reports project- and 
housing authority-lev el data that we aggregated up to the Census place and MSA level. While 
the timing of the matches between the subsidized housing and the Census data is imperfect, it is 
the best we could obtain.22 In addition, we have earlier 1977 HUD data, as well as 1980 Census 
data which we use to create instruments, as we outline below. 
21W e exclucle placeg with a r::~tio of guhgiclizeclunits per capita gre::~ter or eqml to 05, ::~g well ::~g pl aceg with 1.1 or 
more total housing units per capita. These restrictions keep places such as resort communities, with many housing 
units but few permanent residents, out of the sample. 
22Although HUD maintains a data set on subsidized housing in 1993 (See http://www.huduser.org/dataldata.html for 
information on Family Data on Public and Indian Housing (1993)), that data source contains information only on 
projects, not certificate and voucher programs. According to HUD employees, it appears that historic subsidized 
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Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations across both places and MSAs of some 
of the data we use most frequently, weighted by their respective populations. Since means at 
both levels of geography look very similar, we focus on Census places. On average, about 2.7 
people live in each housing unit (1/0.376). There is less than one subsidized housing unit for 
every 50 people in the U.S. (a ratio of0.018), of which 72 percent (0.013/0.018) is project-based 
housing and 28 percent is tenant-based. The "pressure" variable, which we will explain in more 
detail below, indicates that there are three times as many potentially eligible recipients of 
subsidized housing than there are units. About 13 percent of the population in these Census 
places is over 65 years of age, and approximately 14 percent are Black. Nearly 40 percent are 
married and 20 percent did not live in their current county five years prior. (At the MSA level, 
17 percent did not live in the same M SA five years before.) 
Subsidized housing is disproportionately concentrated in large places. As table 3 shows, 
93.4 percent of subsidized housing is located in the top 25 percent of markets, while these 
markets contain 88.0 percent of total housing and 88.5 percent of the population. The top 
percentile of places contains just over half the subsidized housing in the U .S. The same places 
contain just over a third of the population and total housing units. Indeed, the top 35 markets, 
listed in table 4, together include 22 percent of subsidized housing. New York City alone has a 
quarter of a million subsidized units, about 7.5 percent of the national total. However, at the 
MSA level, represented in the second panel of table 3, subsidized housing units are evenly 
distributed with respect to population. 
housing data was not archived. Thus it is impossible to go back and construct data on the quantities of subsidized 
housing in, say, 1990. 
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Ill. Empirical Strategy and Results 
Our empirical approach asks whether markets with more subsidized housing have more 
total housing units, after accounting for other potential determinants of the number of housing 
units. If markets with more subsidized housing units do not have more total housing units than 
they would have in the absence of subsidized housing, we can conclude that subsidized housing 
does not increase the housing stock and must have crowded out private provision of low-income 
housing. If markets with more subsidized housing units have a greater number oftotal housing 
units, all else equal, some subsidized housing must be net new. We recognize the possibility that 
the number of subsidized housing units may be correlated with unobserved determinants of 
housing demand, so we also employ an instrumental variables strategy that we describe below. 
To measure the impact of low-income housing policy on the private housing market 
equilibrium, first we regress the total quantity of housing in a market on the quantity of 
subsidized housing in the market Because housing markets differ enormously in size, we run 
the regressions in per capita terms, weighting using population. This cross sectional strategy 
assumes private housing markets are in equilibrium. That is, the private housing stock must 
have fully adjusted to the presence of subsidized housing. If project-based housing has been 
constructed or vouchers funded recently, the private market may not have had time to respond, 
biasing our results. For example, unanticipated construction of a project-based unit increases the 
housing stock by one unit in the absence of depreciation (since no private units have been 
removed from the housing stock). Similarly, allocating a new voucher would have no effect on 
total housing in the short run since private developers would not yet have had the opportunity or 
time to build anew. These outcomes would make project-based housing look very effective and 
tenant-based housing look like it had no effect on housing consumption, even if in the long run 
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the private housing market would have fully responded. 23 Of course, the private market response 
may be fairly rapid. If subsidized housing is constructed, private housing units do not have to 
fall down for the market to reach equilibrium. If there is population growth, dev elopers simply 
can construct less new supply than otherwise would have been the case. Also, if the construction 
or funding of subsidized housing is anticipated, then developers can more readily adapt. 
To surmount the potential problem of short-run disequilibrium, we use the total occupied 
housing stock per capita as our left-hand-side variable. If a new project-based housing unit is 
allocated to someone who would have consumed a housing unit anyway, it will have no effect on 
the aggregate occupied housing stock. However, if it induces a family to move away from 
sharing a unit to living on its own, the new housing will increase the number of occupied units . 
Similarly, we use occupied subsidized housing units per capita as our independent variable.24 
Using the total housing stock rather than just-occupied yields very similar results, supporting the 
view that private developers can quickly and easily adjust. 25 
The results are reported in table 5. Specification one uses observations on Census places 
and includes the distribution of race, the distribution of age across 12 categories, the distribution 
of family income across 25 categories, and the percent of the population that is married as 
controls. 26 The second specification adds state fixed effects to control for possible unobserved 
heterogeneity. The degree of crowding-out is then identified from differences in the number of 
23 In fact, Murray (1999) finds the aforementioned pattern, suggesting that his time series analysis may be picking 
up a short-nm effect. 
24 HUD reports occupancy rates only for project-based housing. HUD points out that the other forms of housing 
assistance are more-or-less fully occupied and reports the data accordingly. Whether we use occupied or total 
subsidized housing is inconsequential. 
25 The standard errors are comparable and the point estimates on the public subsidized variable varies by about 0.1 0. 
26 We have also replicated the regressions in this paper adding the percent of families with children as a control 
variable. Including it has almost no effect on the coefficients of interest, and we are concerned about its potential 
endogeneity, so we do not incorporate it in our reported results. We are less concerned with the potential 
endogeneity of the share of people in a housing market who are married so we include it as a control; leaving it out 
has little-to-no effect on the measured degree of crowding-out. 
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subsidized housing units across places within the same state. The coefficient on total subsidized 
housing per capita varies from around 0.28 to about 0.35, and is large relative to its standard 
error.27 We can clearly reject both that the coefficient is zero and that it is one. Thus, the full 
sample estimates are inconsistent with both full and zero crowd out, suggesting instead that three 
additional subsidized units add one unit to the aggregate stock, crowding out about two private 
units. 28 The controls explain a significant fraction of the cross-sectional v ariance in occupied 
housing units per capita, almost 80 percent. 
The third and fourth columns revisit the first two specifications using MSAs rather than 
places as the unit of observation. We find completely consistent results, despite the lower power 
due to the higher level of aggregation. 29 Our estimated coefficient on subsidized housing in 
column 3 (0.17) is about 50 percent smaller than in the comparable places regression. Given the 
standard error, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero but it is clearly far from one. 
In column ( 4 ), we add state dummies to the M SA regression. Since some MSAs cross state 
lines, we assign them to the states that contain the largest fraction of their populations. 30 Us ing 
the within-state variation, we find that one additional subsidized housing unit in an MSA leads to 
a statistically significant 0.52 increase in total housing units. 
27 If subsidized housing is not independently allocated across Census places then we underestimate the standard 
errors. One could imagine a number of possible correlations, such as within metro area or more generally across 
space. Rather than model the error structure explicitly, we take two alternative approaches. First, the M SA-level 
regressions reported below are almost certainly provide an upper bound on the standard errors since they assume 
zero independence within MSA. Second, we have estimated this regression using just the 10,506 observations on 
Census places that are in MSAs and including MSA ftxed effects. The point estimates and statistical significance 
change little. 
28 Since we have data on public housing in 1977 we could run an analogous set of regressions for public housing's 
crowd out in 1980. When we do so, the results are economically and statistically similar. 
29 The differences in the point estimates are not due to changes in the geographies covered by places versus MSAs. 
When we repeat the place-level estimation using only places that are contained in MSAs, we obtain results very 
similar to those in the fi rst two columns. 
3° Controlling with the share of population in each state yielded virtually the same results. 
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Because subsidized housing is skewed toward large places, we re-estimate the equations 
for each quartile of places, ranked by population. 31 Columns one and two of table 6 replicate the 
specifications in table 5 and report just the coefficient on occupied subsidized housing in each 
quartile regression. A pattern that emerges is that crowding out is lower in larger places. 32 In the 
bottom quartile, each subsidized unit adds only 0.06 of a unit to the long-run housing stock. But 
in places with an above the median population, each subsidized unit raises the total number of 
occupied units by between 0.2 and 0.4 units. Because population is skewed, with many people 
in the top few percent of Census places, the largest cities may drive the results in columns 1 and 
2. Specification 3, rather than weighting each place by population, weights each Census place 
equally. This emphasizes where in the population distribution the results are coming from. The 
results are v ery similar to the weighted regression suggesting that our model is well-specified. 
The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that subsidized housing displaces the private 
provision of low-income housing. Of course, this does not imply that differences in subsidized 
housing across locations explain the variation in the number of housing units per capita. The 
amount of housing per capita varies considerably across places and MSAs. For example, in the 
last column of Table 4, NYC has 2.45 persons per unit, LA has 2.68, and Denver has 1.95. For a 
variety of reasons, subsidized housing explains very little of these differences. As an empirical 
matter we can measure the upper bound on the fraction of total housing variation attributable to 
subsidized housing as the R-squared from a univariate regression of total occupied housing per 
capita on per capita subsidized housing. The coefficient on subsidized housing in this regression 
is 0.84, and the R-squared is 5 percent. Thus, 5 percent is an upper bound on the fraction of 
31 There are not enough MSAs to estimate the quartile regressions at the MSA level. 
32 In part, this is due to the fact that in larger places a greater share of the subsidized units are tenant-based and that 
form of assistance exhibits less crowding-out. We will show this in more detail in table 7. Also, in larger places 
there is a larger needy population relative to the availability of subsidized units . We will show in table 6 that this 
kind of excess demand leads to lower crowding-out. 
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housing variation explained by subsidized housing. Because subsidized housing is correlated 
with other determinants of total housing, the true effect of subsidized on total housing differs 
from the coefficient in the simple regression. With other covariates and state dummies included, 
the increment toR-squared from adding the subsidized housing variable is 0.28 percent, and the 
coefficient on subsidized housing becomes much smaller, at 0.52, although it remains 
statistically significant. 
There are several reasons why subsidized housing is not an important determinant of the 
cross-sectional variation in units per capita. First, there is crowd-out itself. In a world with 
complete crowd-out, after accounting for other determinants of housing demand, total housing 
would be constant across place, and subsidized housing would therefore explain none of its 
variation. To the degree crowd-out is partial, the explanatory power of the subsidized housing 
stock is mitigated. Second, much of the cross-sectional variation is due to other factors that 
influence housing demand, such as income and family structure. When we include just 
observable covariates, and not subsidized housing, 91 percent of the variation in housing units 
per capita at the MSA level can be explained. Adding state dummies brings the R-squared up to 
almost 96 percent. Finally, subsidized housing accounts for a fairly small number of housing 
units. Thus there is not much scope for differences in subsidized housing to explain much of the 
variation in the number of total housing units per capita. 
The fact that subsidized housing is not a large component of the cross sectional variation 
in total housing units per capita does not imply that the crowd out of private housing by 
subsidized housing is not large or significant- it still is. However, it is just one component 
among many that affect this market. That is why we focus on the crowd-out phenomenon rather 
than trying to explain all the considerable variation in units per capita. 
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However, the substantial observable cross-sectional differences in housing units per 
capita may lead one to worry that there is also unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with 
subsidized housing, leading to a spurious result. We explore both of these possibilities below in 
section 3.3. It will tum out that is not the case. If anything, places with few units per capita are 
more likely to have subsidized housing, leading us to underestimate the degree of crowd-out. 
1. Crowd Out and the Pressure on Subsidized Housing 
Because subsidized housing adds to the low income housing stock only to the degree that 
the recipients of the subsidy could not obtain a unit otherwise, one might expect that subsidized 
housing would have a larger average effect on the number of occupied units in places where 
there is more excess demand for it, or demand "pressure." That is, we expect crowd-out to be 
smaller in markets where the subsidized housing is scarce relative to the local low-income 
population. In those places, the subsidized units are more likely to have been awarded to 
recipients with worse housing alternatives in the absence of the program. 33 Finding this pattern 
will also lend additional credence to our estimation approach. 
We proxy for the excess demand for subsidized housing with the ratio of the existing 
supply of subsidized housing to the number of households we estimate are likely to be eligible 
for it. We estimate the number of eligible recipients by applying the Federal eligibility criteria to 
Census data. 34 According to subsidized housing eligibility rules, a family of four is typically 
33 In theory, subsidized housing is supposed to be awarded to the neediest households first. However, even if that 
does not occur in practice, our "pressure" test will still work, as long as the average subsidized housing recipient in 
a high-pressure place is l ess likely to consume a private unit in the absence of the subsidized housing program. 
For example, suppose there were two types of families, those with private units and those without. Places 
with higher measured pressure simply have a higher fraction of families "without." An allocation rule that 
randomly distributed subsidized housing to the population would still have less crowd out in the high pressure areas. 
Allocating subsidized housing to the unhoused first would magnifY the differences in the effect of subsidized 
housing on total housing. 
34 One could imagine using the length of the waiting list or the local eligibility rules for this purpose. However, 
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eligible if its income falls short of 50 percent of the local family median income. 35 Using data on 
the number of families in each of the 22 income cells, we compute rough numbers of eligible 
families per Census place.36 We then calculate an index which is the number of subsidized units 
per eligible family . For markets where this index is small, the pressure on subsidized housing is 
greater. 
We then allow the extent of crowd out to differ across places according to the amount of 
pressure on subsidized housing by adding an interaction of subsidized housing per capita with 
the index. Because we expect more crowding out where there is less pressure on the 
government-supported low-income housing stock, we expect a negative coefficient on the 
interaction term. We also control for the level of low-income housing pressure by including it 
directly as a covariate in case it reflects otherwise unobserved heterogeneity. 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients on subsidized housing per capita, demand 
"pressure" on subsidized housing, and the interaction ofthe two, using the place-level data. The 
specifications mirror those in table 5. If there were no subsidized units in a market, we find that 
an additional unit of subsidized housing per capita would lead to between about 0.38 and 0.51 
more housing units per capita. 
Supporting the hypothesis that more demand pressure, which corresponds to a smaller 
index value, raises the average effectiveness of subsidized housing, the coefficients on the 
waiting lists are poorly measured and are capped and eligibility rules vary by public housing authority and are 
difficult to obtain. [Olsen (2001)] As long as this proxy broadly reflects differences in the degree to which various 
places are sufficiently served by subsidized housing, it should be accurate enough for our hypothesis test. 
35 During our sample period, for projects with contracts taking effect after 1981,95 percent of units were reserved 
for "VLI," or "Very Low Income," families. A VLI family of four is defined as one with income below half the 
local median for a family of four. As our discussion of the rules above indicates, some families with up to 80 
percent oflocal median income may also be eligible, although spots for such families are limited. The VLI income 
cutoffs for families of different sizes are obtained by scaling the figure for a family of four with a nationally uniform 
factor. 
36 These estimates are "rough" for two reasons. First, we have only discrete cells, not the exact distribution of 
income. Second, in computing the number of eligibles we do not adjust for family size. 
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interaction term of pressure and subsidized housing are uniformly negative. All are very 
precisely estimated. This result implies that the efficacy of subsidized housing in generating net 
new housing units declines as more is available relative to the needy population. The middle 
three rows of the table report estimates of the effect adding one more unit of subsidized housing 
would have on total housing, evaluated at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of 
the pressure index (among the 10,049 places with subsidized housing). 37 Focusing on 
specification (2), we see that in places with little subsidized housing per eligible family (high 
pressure), an additional subsidized unit raises total housing by 0.49 units. At a place with the 
median value of the index, the effect falls to 0.47. In places with relatively plentiful subsidized 
housing relative to the eligible population, the effect drops to 0.44. We interpret these estimates 
to mean that in places with relatively more subsidized housing, the marginal recipient family 
would have been more likely to occupy a (private) unit in the absence of the housing policy.38 
2. Project-based versus tenant-based assistance 
To this point we have treated project-based and tenant-based assistance as having similar 
effects on the private housing stock. Yet, that need not be the case. Since U.S. policy is moving 
away from project-based subsidized housing towards more tenant-based assistance [Quigley 
(2000)], it would be worthwhile to determine whether vouchers and certificates lead to more or 
less net new housing than do project-based subsidized housing programs. 
Separately identifying the crowd-out effects of project- and tenant-based programs could 
also shed additional light on the believability of our results. A priori, one would not necessarily 
37 We also estimated the regressions underlying table 7 using only those places that had subsidized housing and the 
results were virtually identical. 
38 When we repeat the estimation using MSA-level data, we fmd no economically significant effect on the 
interaction term. At this aggregated level, there is little independent variation between subsidized housing units per 
capita and per low-income household. 
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expect any differential crowd-out effect between the two types of programs. If there are 
differences in eligibility, however, the program that is more targeted towards families that 
otherwise would not be housed should exhibit less crowd-out. Olsen (2001) claims that 
vouchers and certificates are given to more needy recipients than project-based housing since 
administrators want to avoid concentrations of poverty in housing projects. 39 If this claim is 
true, we should see tenant-based programs generating more net new housing than project-based 
h . 40 ousmg. 
Table 8 finds support for this hypothesis. The specifications are the same as the columns 
(1) and (2) in table 5, with even-numbered columns including state fixed effects. In the first two 
columns, we estimate the effect of project-based subsidized housing on the total stock of housing 
units using Census place-level observations.41 An additional unit of occupied project-based 
subsidized housing is estimated to increase the total occupied housing stock by only 0.2 to 0.3 
units, crowding out 0.7 to 0.8 private units. In the second two columns, an additional unit of 
tenant-based assistance increases the occupied housing stock by about 0.7 units, crowding out 
less than one-third of a priv ate housing unit. 
The regressions in columns ( 5) and ( 6) of table 8 include both project-based subsidized 
housing per capita and tenant-based housing per capita as explanatory variables in case the 
quantities of project- and tenant-based units in a Census place are related. Once again, we fmd 
39 In addition, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program allows landlords to charge 30 percent of the maximum 
eligible income - 50 percent of the local median- as rent, pricing out all but the highest income eligible families. 
40 Other evidence suggests proj ect-based housing has less impoverished tenants. Using the place-level data, we 
regressed the difference (within a Census place) in average family income between Section 8 Certificate and 
Voucher residents and public housing residents on the difference in average family size and a constant. The 
estimates show that, controlling for family size and unobserved place-level characteristics, residents in tenant-based 
Section 8 Certificate and Voucher units have approximately 6 percent lower incomes than residents of project-based 
public housing units. 
41 Project-based housing is defined as Public and Indian housing, Section 236, Section 8 new construction and 
substantial rehabilitation, the low-income housing tax credit, and "other." Tenant-based housing is Section 8 
certificates and vouchers. 
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evidence that tenant-based housing crowds out less private housing than project-based 
subsidized housing does. An additional unit of project-based housing is estimated to increase the 
total occupied housing stock by just 0.17 to 0.28 units, while one more unit of tenant-based 
housing would increase the occupied housing stock by approximately 0.65 units.4 2 When we 
repeat the estimation at the MSA level, in column (7), we find a similar pattern of less crowding 
out from tenant-based subsidized housing. When we add state fixed effects to the MSA-level 
regression, in column (8), the ordering of project- and tenant-based housing reverses, but the 
standard errors are large enough that we cannot distinguish between the two. 
3. Robustness 
In this section we consider the robustness of our estimates to four issues: correlation of 
subsidized housing with unobserved determinants of housing demand, time-constant unobserved 
heterogeneity, migration, and how we measure the quantity of housing consumed. We examine 
each of these in tum. 
Our empirical strategy thus far allows inference about the effect of subsidized housing on 
total housing if the variation in the number of subsidized housing units per capita were 
exogenous. If subsidized housing is located in markets for reasons related to unobserved 
determinants of total housing, then ordinary least squares (and other such approaches) will y ield 
biased estimates of the effect of subsidized housing on the private housing market equilibrium. 
42 One should resist the temptation to extrapolate from these results that all housing programs should be tenant-
based. If the differences between them are simply due to program administrators giving the vouchers to the most 
needy recipients, moving the proj ect-based housing recipients into the voucher program will merely increase the 
amount of crowd-out due to the voucher program. It could also be that since tenant-based housing assistance is not 
as historically determined, it is allocated more to the places with the greatest need and thus is more effective at 
providing net new housing. That result does not necessarily argue for moving away from the existing project-based 
housing and turning towards the more flexible voucher system since it does n ot incorporate differences in unit 
quality, effectiveness of providing support services (Currie and Yelowitz (2000)), neighborhood environment (Katz 
et al. (2001)), or program cost. (Olsen (2000)). 
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As we pointed out earlier, almost all project-based subsidized housing in the U.S. was 
built prior to the late 1980s. It seems likely that project-based housing, when rrrst erected, was 
placed in its locations for reasons related to the prevailing demand for housing, including 
possibly demand factors unobservable to us. However, if the reasons for locating subsidized 
housing change over time (so that if subsidized housing were built today from scratch, its 
distribution across markets would be different), then it will be reasonable to view the quantities 
of project-based housing as uncorrelated with current observable housing demand determinants. 
The quantity of section 8 certificates and vouchers is another matter, since they did not 
exist before 1976. However, the budget rules that determine the funding for each locality, and 
thus the number of subsidized housing units the locality can provide, is set by statute. The 
budgeting rules during our sample period started with the level of appropriations allocated by 
Congress for a given year. From that, anything previously agreed to or that needs ongoing 
spending must be paid. Second, HUD pays for anything Congress specially requests. Finally, 
the remainder is divided among allocation areas according a score that is determined by the 
area's proportion of the national total of: (a) the renter population (20 percent), (b) renters in 
poverty (20 percent), (c) rental occupancy that is more than 1.01 persons/room (10 percent), (d) 
the number of rental units needed to raise market vacancy rate to normal levels ( 10 percent), (e) 
number of rental units built before 1940 occupied by impoverished (20 percent), (f) other 
measurable conditions (20 percent). That division is constrained by rules that HUD cannot 
spend less than 0.5 percent on any single state and cannot spend less than 25 percent in 
nonmetropolitan areas. 
Of these rules, we deem a portion of rule (e) to be reasonably uncorrelated with current 
housing demand. Accordingly, we will instrument with the number of units in the Census place 
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built before 1940. Presumably the number of impoverished may be correlated with current 
unobservable housing demand so we leave that portion of the budget rule out of our instrument 
set. 
We reestimate our base specifications on place-level data, first employing both 
instruments: the number of public housing units per capita in 1977-1980 and the number of 
housing units per capita built prior to 1940. Then we try instrumenting with each separately. 
The results are reported in table 9, with the first stage regressions shown in appendix table A. 
Once again, the specifications mirror those in table 5. 
Instrumenting seems to increase the measured crowd-out relative to table 5. The 
estimated coefficient on the total occupied subsidized units drops by 75 percent (from its value 
in table 5) to 0.057 (0.028). This implies that an additional subsidized unit has almost no effect 
on the total housing stock. However, adding state fixed effects increases the coefficient to 0.40 
from its table 5 value of 0.35. The next two panels, which include each instrument separately, 
suggest why state fixed effects change the estimates so much. Columns 3 and 4 show that 
instrumenting with the 1977 public housing units per capita leads to a finding of complete or 
almost-complete crowd out (0.03 net new units when we estimate without state dummies and 
0.18 net new units when the state controls are included.) Column 5, where we instrument with 
the number of housing units per capita built before 1940, finds the same effect: one subsidized 
unit leads to 0.16 (0.05) net new units overall. The results obtained in column 6, which include 
state dummies, show an implausibly large effect of subsidized housing on total housing. We 
surmise that this arises because the pre-1940 housing stock, while it varies across states 
reflecting historical state-by-state settlement patterns, does not vary substantially within states. 
This curious result explains why the column 2 coefficient exceeds its analogue in table 5. 
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While our instruments are not enormously successful, our IV results provide support for 
our basic OLS and fixed effects estimates showing that low-income housing subsidies increase 
housing consumption. For two reasons, we believe that the IV results provide a lower-bound on 
the true net effect of housing subsidies on aggregate housing units. First, especially in columns 
(3) and (4), our instrument mainly reflects the amount of public housing in an area. Because 
vouchers may not be allocated in the same manner as project-based housing is distributed, the IV 
estimates are best compared to the estimates ofthe effect of project-lev el assistance on total 
housing, which we document in table 8 to be much smaller than the effect of tenant-lev el 
assistance. Viewed that way, the IV estimates are not so different from the OLS results, 
although they are still smaller. Second, a plausible kind of endogeneity in our 1977 public 
housing unit instrument will tend to drive our IV results toward zero. Suppose that public 
housing units were allocated in greater amounts where they were most necessary, for example in 
places where there are too few units per capita. If the need for subsidized housing were 
persistent enough that the 1977 distribution were not completely exogenous in the 1990s, there 
would be more subsidized housing in places with less private-market housing, which would 
appear in these estimates as larger crowd-out, or little net program effect on total housing units. 
Another potential concern is that places with large amounts of subsidized housing have 
large amounts of total housing for reasons related to neither subsidized housing nor other 
observables. In that case, the unobserved heterogeneity would lead us to erroneously find a 
relationship between subsidized housing and total housing when none existed. We believe this 
to be unlikely. For one, the IV strategy described above should address this issue, and finds 
results consistent with the OLS regressions in Table 5. 
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Another solution- if we had panel data on total housing, subsidized housing, and other 
observables, as well as exogenous variation in the change in subsidized housing over time-
would be to regress of the change in total housing on the change in subsidized housing, thus 
differencing out unobserved heterogeneity and uncovering the causal relationship between 
subsidized and total housing. 
While we do not have all of these ingredients, we do have data on total housing per capita 
at the MSA level as early as 1960. About two thirds of subsidized housing in existence in 1990 
appeared since 1960. As our first test, we regressed total housing in 1960 on 1996 subsidized 
housing and 1990 covariates. If our results were due to persistent unobservable heterogeneity, 
this regression should yield similar coefficients to our basic results. When we estimate these 
"asynchronous" models (analogous to columns 3 and 4 of table 5), we find a small and 
insignificant subsidized housing coefficient for the analogue to column 4, which includes state 
fixed effects, and a negative and significant coefficient for the analogue to column 3, which does 
not. These estimates provide substantial reassurance that the basic results are not attributable to 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Next, we regressed the difference in total housing per capita between 1960 and 1990 in 
each of the 252 MSAs on 1996 subsidized housing per capita and controls. This pseudo-panel 
regression pretends that there was no subsidized housing in 1960 and assumes that growth in 
subsidized housing since then was exogenous. Despite these strong assumptions, we again find 
results consistent with the OLS regressions in Table 5. With the standard set of covariates, the 
coefficient on occupied subsidized housing units per capita is 0.81 with a standard error of 0.31. 
This indicates that each subsidized housing unit in existence in 1996 was associated with a 0.8 
unit increase in total occupied units between 1960 and 1990. With state dummies, the coefficient 
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on subsidized housing drops to 0.42 and while it is no longer statistically significant (standard 
error of0.36), it is consistent with the results we found earlier. 
Another issue with our estimation strategy is that an abundance of subsidized housing 
might attract inter-market migration of eligible persons. If so, then the size of the subsidized 
housing coefficient in our regressions might reflect a movement of people to housing rather than 
household formation within the market. 43 In that case, we would overestimate the degree of 
crowding out. One way we have addressed this issue is to use MSAs, in addition to Census 
places, as our unit of observation. Any family that moves across Census places but within MSA 
will be correctly accounted for in our MSA regressions. Since the results are consistent between 
the two levels of geography, we are comfortable that within-MSA migration is not biasing our 
Census place results. 
To address the possibility that endogenous mobility across MSAs is affecting our 
estimates, we have repeated our basic regressions including a variable for the amount of 
migration. At the Census place level, we define migration as the percent of the population who 
lived in a different county in 1985, which is the highest degree of granularity available in the 
Census. For the MSA regressions, we use the percent of the population who lived in a different 
MSA in 1985. Both definitions include people who move within the U.S. as well as immigrants, 
with the view that population inflows may be partially determined by the generosity of the 
subsidized housing program. 
We start by investigating whether subsidized housing and migration are related. The first 
three columns of table 10 report the results of regressing the number of subsidized housing units 
per capita on immigrants per capita as well as the usual set of controls. Column (1) finds that 
43 Painter (1997) finds little within-metro area moving in response to local disparities in the length of waiting lists. 
However, he does not provide evidence on moving across metropolitan areas to obtain public housing. 
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Census places with more subsidized housing have less immigration. However, once we include 
state fixed effects in column (2), we find that within states there is a positive relationship 
between subsidized housing and immigration. The pattern repeats itself, with less statistical 
power, at the M SA level. Since the standard errors using the MSA data with state dummies are 
large, we report only the specification without state dummies, in column (3).44 
Yet, when one controls for immigration, the coefficients of interest in the study are 
essentially unchanged, both at the Census place and MSA lev els. Columns (4) through (9) of 
table 10 provide evidence of this by repeating a series of specifications from tables 5 and 7. We 
fmd that a greater fraction of in-migrants is correlated with more occupied housing units per 
capita but there are v irtually no changes in the estimated coefficients on any of the subsidized 
housing variables when we include a migration control. Even the interaction with the pressure 
variable, which measures excess demand for subsidized housing, remains unchanged between 
table 7 and columns (6) and (7) when we control for migration and even migration interacted 
with pressure. Hence we find no evidence that our result is attributable to migration. 
One last issue concerns our measure of the quantity ofhousing consumed, the number of 
units per capita. Census places with more subsidized housing may hav e more housing units 
overall simply because of subdivision of their structures into more units rather than adding net 
new units. To surmount this possibility, we first try using a dependent variable that more nearly 
measures housing space, as opposed to units: rooms per capita. These regressions, in columns 
( 1 )-( 4) of table 11, show that an additional subsidized unit raises the number of rooms per capita 
by about 0.5 to 1 at the place level, and 3 to 4.5 when estimated at the MSA level. Because units 
44 The estimated coefficient on occupied subsidized in the MSA regression with state dummies is 0.17 with a 
standard error of 0.55. 
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contain, on average, just over five rooms, this magnitude of additional rooms is comparable to 
roughly 0.2 to 0.6 net new units per subsidized unit. 
A potential concern with this regression is that the average size of units may vary across 
geographic markets in a way that is correlated with the number of subsidized units per capita. 
Columns (5) - (8) examine the relationship between subsidized housing and unit size, and we 
find that Census places with one more subsidized unit per capita have 0.89 more rooms per unit, 
controlling for income, race, age, and marital status. However, once we add state fixed effects 
(in column 6), we find that having more subsidized units is correlated with fewer rooms per unit, 
which suggests that some of the net new units we have attributed to the presence of subsidized 
housing potentially might not reflect a real increase in living space. At the M SA level, 
subsidized housing appears to be positiv ely correlated with rooms per unit. Howev er, the 
standard errors are large so while the correlation in column (7) is statistically distinguishable 
from zero, the 95 percent confidence interval includes the value in column (1). With MSA data 
and state dummies, in column (8), the point estimate is not statistically different from zero. 
To deal with potentially spurious correlation between unit size, the amount of subsidized 
housing, and rooms or housing units per capita, we control for the number of rooms per unit in 
our crowd-out regressions. When we use rooms per capita as the dependent variable, in columns 
(9)-( 12), our results are similar to those in columns ( 1)-( 4). Using place-level data, in columns 
(9) and (10), a one unit increase in the number of subsidized units per capita raises the number of 
rooms per capita by anywhere from 0.76 (0.11 standard error) to 0.98 (0.11). At the MSA level 
the effect on new rooms per capita is not statistically distinguishable from zero in column (11). 
The point estimate grows large enough with the addition of state dummies in column ( 12) to be 
statistically significant but, once again, the standard error is large enough that the estimate is 
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consistent with the ones found in the previous three columns. We also find that places and M SAs 
with larger units in terms of the number of rooms have more rooms per capita. 
The last 4 columns of table 11 revisit subsidized housing's effect on the number of 
housing units per capita, controlling for cross sectional heterogeneity in rooms per unit. In 
columns (13) through (16), we see that our original result that a subsidized unit generates from 
one-quarter to one-third of a net new occupied housing unit is basically unchanged. The main 
difference is that the point estimate on occupied subsidized housing units in the MSA 
specification in column (3) rises to 0.25 from 0.17, and is now significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level.45 The negative coefficients on the rooms-per-unit variable suggest that places 
with larger units have fewer units per capita. 
IV. Conclusion 
A simple but natural test for subsidized housing programs is whether they allow families 
that would otherwise not have, to occupy their own housing units. Given equilibrium housing 
market responses to government programs, it is by no means obv ious that programs that place 
families into their own housing units will raise the total number of families occupying units . The 
effect of such programs depends crucially on whether recipient families would have occupied 
their own units in the absence of the programs. 
We provide a simple evaluation of this question. We ask whether places or MSAs with 
more subsidized housing also have more total housing, after accounting for housing demand. 
We rmd that government-financed units raise the total number of units, although on average 
three government-subsidized units displace two units that would otherwise have been provided 
45 Including both rooms per unit and immigration per capita as controls yields results very similar to these with 
smaller standard errors. 
3 1 
by the private market. There is less crowd out in more populous markets, and less crowd out in 
places where excess demand for subsidized housing is higher because there are fewer 
government-financed units per eligible person. Tenant-based housing programs seem to be more 
effective at providing housing units to people who otherwise would not have their own. These 
results remain even with sensible instruments, do not appear to be driven by endogenous 
migration or unobserved heterogeneity, and are robust to our measure of housing consumption. 
We take these results to be an indication of a positive real effect of low-income housing 
subsidies. Because we observe an aggregate increase in the number of units, the programs do 
not merely redistribute the same housing among the population. These results are also sufficient 
(though not necessary) for the program to have a real economic impact. Alternative effects of 
subsidized housing programs would make our results more difficult to find -such as subsidies 
affecting equilibrium rents rather than quantities of housing consumed - and often further 
support our conclusion of a real benefit. For example, subsidized housing may also improve the 
quality of housing consumed and, since it is also an income transfer, it may raise non-housing 
consumption. 
However, much work remains. Public provision of housing is typically quite costly. 
[Olsen (2000)] In addition, Susin (2002) points out that if vouchers lead to higher market rents, 
on net the programs might transfer income from tenants to landlords. The rudimentary measures 
of housing consumption we examine here, the number of units and rooms consumed, is 
insufficient to determine whether the existing subsidized housing programs are the most efficient 
way of prov iding low income housing assistance or targeting low-income families for financial 
aid. All of the factors mentioned above would need to be weighed when determining whether the 
government should prov ide a private good, such as housing. 
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Table 1: Number of Subsidized Housing Units, By Program 
Public 
Indian 
Program 
Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers 
Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation 
Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation 
Section 236 
Other Subsidy 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
Total 
Number of housing units 
1,326,224 
67,744 
1,346,306 
105,845 
897,160 
447,382 
292,237 
332,085 
4,814,983 
Source: A Picture of Subsidized Households, December 1996; www.huduser.org These figures 
are for HUD rental subsidy programs and the LIHTC only, and as such do not reflect owner-
occupied units that receive subsidies through various programs. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Place Level MSALevel 
Standard Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation 
Occupied housing units per capita 0.376 0.045 0.369 0.021 
Occupied subsidized housing units per 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.005 
capita 
Occupied project-based housing units 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.005 per capita 
Occupied tenant-based housing units 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 per capita 
Subsidized housing "Pressure" 0.322 0.270 0.298 0.104 
Subsidized units * Pressure 0.010 0.021 0.005 0.004 
Percent 65+ 0.130 0.060 0.118 0.029 
Percent Black 0.140 0.175 0.129 0.083 
Percent American Indian 0.007 0.035 0.005 0.008 
Percent Asian 0.037 0.067 0.036 0.054 
Percent other race 0.049 0.076 0.049 0.056 
Percent married 0.396 0.078 0.410 0.028 
Percent who moved to the area in the 0.201 0.102 0.169 0.059 last five years 
Rooms per capita 2.144 0.382 2.141 0.221 
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted by population. The number of observations underlying 
the place-level statistics is 22,872, except for the rows incorporating subsidized housing 
"pressure," which have 22,632 observations. The MSA-level statistics have 252 observations in 
all cases. ''Percent who moved to the area in the last five years," in the case of the place-level 
data, is the share of persons who lived outside the county five years ago. For the MSA-level 
data, it is the share of persons who lived outside the MSA five years ago. 
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Table 3: Geographic Distributions 
Census Designated Places 
Percent of Number of 
subsidized Percent of subsidized Number of 
Percent of Census housing total housing Census-
Places, ranked by units in housing Percent of units per Average Designated 
2o2ulation sam2le units 2o2ulation ca2ita Po2ulation Places 
Full sample 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.019 7,817 22,872 
Top 50 percent 98.6 96.4 96.7 0.019 15,114 11,434 
Top 25 percent 93.4 88.0 88.5 0.020 27,661 5,718 
Top 10 percent 81.9 72.7 73.1 0.021 57,116 2,287 
Top 5 percent 72.2 60.5 60.5 0.022 94,640 1,143 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
Percent of Number of 
subsidized Percent of subsidized 
Percent of MSAs, housing total housing 
ranked by units in housing Percent of units per Average Number of 
EOEulation samEle units EOEulation caEita PoEulation MSAs 
Full sample 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.017 690,358 252 
Top 50 percent 89.4 89.8 90.0 0.017 1,242,803 126 
Top 25 percent 77.1 77.1 77.4 0.017 3,010,888 63 
Top 10 percent 58.3 58.7 59.3 0.017 4,062,213 25 
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Table 4: Population, Subsidized and Total Housing Units, Eligibles, and Crowdedness for 
the Top 35 Places Ranked by Subsidized Housing 
Total Total Imputed 
subsidized housing number of Rooms per Persons 
Place PoEulation housing units eligibles caEita Eer unit 
New York 7,322,564 249,924 2,992,169 455,108 1.68 2.45 
Chicago 2,783,726 83,344 1, 133,039 181,758 1.92 2.46 
Los Angeles 3,485,398 54,272 1,299,%3 192,818 1.54 2.68 
Baltimore 736,014 38,298 303,706 44,852 2.21 2.42 
Philadelphia 1,585,577 36,831 674,899 108,167 2.28 2.35 
Boston 574,283 30,923 250,863 29,793 1.94 2.29 
Dallas 1,006,831 30,700 465,579 60,720 2.17 2.16 
Atlanta 394,017 25,923 182,754 29,430 2.27 2.16 
Detroit 1,027,974 24,857 410,027 80,457 2.14 2.51 
Houston 1,630,672 22,319 726,402 112, 197 2.09 2.24 
Newark 275,221 21,906 102,473 18,926 1.64 2.69 
Columbus 632,958 21,889 278,102 34,692 2.29 2.28 
Cleveland 505,616 21,660 224,311 36,979 2.34 2.25 
San Antonio 935,927 20,363 365,400 61,220 1.89 2.56 
Pittsburgh 369,879 19,955 170,159 22,830 2.40 2.17 
San Francisco 723,959 19,749 328,471 36,163 1.86 2.20 
New Orleans 4%,938 19,605 225,573 37,719 2.18 2.20 
St. Louis 3%,685 18,678 194,919 23,590 2.27 2.04 
Milwaukee 628,088 18,322 254,204 39,120 2.00 2.47 
Nashville-Davids on 488,518 17,838 219,521 27,298 2.31 2.23 
Memphis 610,337 16,728 248,573 41,727 2.14 2.46 
Seattle 516,259 16,344 249,032 22,026 2.34 2.07 
Cincinnati 364,040 15,732 169,088 24,317 2.20 2.15 
Kansas City 435,141 15,332 201,773 25,480 2.47 2.16 
Denver 467,610 14,784 239,636 27,871 2.56 1.95 
Oakland 372,242 14,398 154,737 23,714 1.84 2.41 
Louisville 269,157 13,775 124,062 19,523 2.29 2.17 
Minneapolis 368,383 13,671 172,666 18,947 2.27 2.13 
Birmingham 265,852 13,254 117,636 17,501 2.31 2.26 
San Diego 1,110,549 12,263 431,722 54,311 1.82 2.57 
Buffalo 328,123 12,125 151,971 21,446 2.55 2.16 
St. Paul 272,235 12,011 117,583 14,113 2.16 2.32 
El Paso 515,342 11,334 168,625 36,701 1.68 3.06 
Portland 437,398 11,331 198,319 22,575 2.35 2.21 
Akron 223,019 10,936 96,372 13,942 2.37 2.31 
Total: 32,556,532 1,001,374 13,644,329 2,018,031 
Sources: Population, total housing, subsidized housing, eligibles, and rooms per capita: 1990 
Census. Subsidized housing data are derived from HUD's Picture of Subsidized Housing, 1996. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Subsidized Housing on 
Total Occupied Housing Units 
(1) (2) (3) 
Occupied subsidized housing 0.276 0.354 0.173 
units per capita (0.012) (0.013) (0.135) 
Percent Black -0.028 -0.024 -0.011 (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) 
Percent American Indian -0.030 -0.055 0.295 (0.004) (0.004) (0.068) 
Percent Asian -0.072 -0.077 -0.072 (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
Percent other race -O.l14 -0.118 -0.052 (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) 
Percent married 0.018 -0.030 0.103 (0.005) (0.006) (0.041) 
Constant 0.292 0.347 -0.503 (0.029) (0.028) (0.798) 
State dummies No Yes No 
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes 
Unit of observation Place Place MSA 
Number of observations 22,872 22,872 252 
Adjusted R 2 0.76 0.79 0.89 
(4) 
0.518 
(0.157) 
0.028 
(0.016) 
0.359 
(0.128) 
-.l15 
(0.048) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
0.055 
(0.055) 
0.325 
(0.580) 
Yes 
Yes 
MSA 
252 
0.94 
Notes: Left-hand-side variable is occupied housing units per capita. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Regressions are OLS, weighted by population. In columns (1) and (2) the 
observations consist of Census-designated places. In column (3), the observations are on 
metropolitan statistical areas. The omitted race category is ''white." The "other" covariates that 
are included but not reported are: the income distribution across 25 categories and the age 
distribution across 12 categories. Specifications (2) and ( 4) add state dummies. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Subsidized Housing on Occupied Housing Units, 
by population of the Census-designated place 
Percent of Census Places, (1) (2) (3) 
ranked by population 
Bottom quartile 0.060 0.058 0.051 (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) 
Second quartile 0.166 0.163 0.153 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Third quartile 0.248 0.231 0.209 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Top quartile 0.225 0.377 0.346 (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
State dummies No Yes Yes 
Notes: Left-hand-side variable is occupied housing units per capita. The reported coefficients 
are the estimates for "occupied subsidized housing units per capita." Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each observation is a Census-designated place. Specifications (1) and (2) are 
weighted by population, specification (3) is not. All regressions include controls for the age, 
race, and income distributions, and the percent married. Specifications (2) and (3) add state 
dummies. 
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Table 7: Crowd-Out is Lower in Places Where There is Less Subsidized Housing 
Relative to the Needy Population 
Occupied subsidized housing units 
per capita 
Subsidized housing ''Pressure" 
Subsidized units * Pressure 
8(occupied housing)/ 8(subsidized 
housing) evaluated at: 
Low pressure: 
25th percentile (0.511) 
Medium pressure: 
50th percentile (0.282) 
Hi~h pressure: 
75 percentile (0.093) 
State dummies 
Unit of observation 
Number of observations 
Adjusted R2 
(1) (2) 
0.375 0.506 
(0.041) (0.040) 
0.004 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.150 -0.133 
(0.011) (0.010) 
0.298 0.438 
(0.041) (0.039) 
0.332 0.468 
(0.041) (0.039) 
0.361 0.493 
(0.041) (0.040) 
No Yes 
Place Place 
22,632 22,632 
0.77 0.80 
Notes: Left-hand-side variable is occupied housing units per capita. Standard errors are in 
parentheses . Regressions are OLS, weighted by population. The observations consist of22,632 
Census-designated places. Subsidized housing ''Pressure" is the number of subsidized housing 
units div ided by the number of people that have less than 50 percent of the median family 
income. All regressions also include controls for the age, race, and income distributions, and the 
percent married. Specification (2) adds state dummies. 
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Table 8: Do Project-based and Tenant-based Assistance Have Different Rates of Crowd-Out? 
Project-based assistance Tenant-based assistance Project and Tenant-based Assistance 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Occupied project- 0.209 0.313 0.167 0.278 0.049 0.696 based housing (0.015) (0.0 15) (0.014) (0.015) (0.173) (0.213) per capita 
Occupied tenant- 0.720 0.681 0.673 0.617 0.429 0.238 based housing (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.289) (0.276) per capita 
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Unit of 
Place Place Place Place Place Place 
observation MSA MSA 
Number of 
observations 22,872 22,872 22,872 22,872 22,872 22,872 252 252 
Adjusted R- 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.89 0.94 
squared 
Notes: Left-hand-side variable is occupied housing units per capita. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are OLS, 
weighted by population. In columns (1) through (6) the observations consist of Census-designated places. In columns (7) and (8), the 
observations are on metropolitan statistical areas . Regressions are weighted by population. All regressions also include controls for 
the age, race, and income distributions, and the percent manied. 
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Table 9: The Effect of Subsidized Housing on Total Occupied Housing Units, Instrumental Variables Estimates 
Occupied subsidized housing 
units per capita ( 1996) 
State dummies 
Adjusted R2 
Instruments: Occupied public 
housing units per capita (1980) 
and Number of housing units Instrument: Occupied public 
per capita built before 1940 housing units per capita ( 1980) 
0.057 0.395 0.026 0.183 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
No Yes No Yes 
0.76 0.79 0.76 0.79 
Instrument: Number ofhousing 
units per capita built before 
1940 
0.157 
(0.051) 
No 
0.76 
1.970 
(0.093) 
Yes 
0.65 
Notes: Left-hand-side variable is occupied housing units per capita. Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 21,237 
observations in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), and 22,872 in colums (3) and (4). Each is a Census-designated place. Regressions are 
weighted by population. All regressions also include controls for the age, race, and income distributions, and the percent married. 
Occupied subsidized housing units per capita is an endogenous variable in these regressions and the variables at the top of the 
columns are added to the instrument set. 
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Table 10: Subsidized housing and immigration 
Left-hand-side variable 
Immigration eer caeita Occueied housing units eer caeita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Occupied subsidized 
-0.146 0.213 -0.940 0.281 0.356 0.392 0.512 0.223 0.520 
housing units per capita (0.039) (0.037) (0.554) (0.012) (0.013) (0.042) (0.040) (0.133) (0.157) 
Immigration per capita 0.014 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.053 -0.012 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0 16) (0.022) 
Subsidized housing 0.007 0.002 
"Pressure" (0.002) (0.002) 
Subsidized units * 
-0.152 -0. 133 
Pressure (0.011) (0.010) 
Immigration * Pressure -0.049 -0.025 (0.007) (0.007) 
State dummies No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Unit of observation Place Place MSA Place Place Place Place MSA MSA 
Number of 22,872 22,872 252 22,872 22,872 22,632 22,632 252 252 
observations: 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.66 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.90 0.94 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are OLS, weighted by population. In columns (1), (2), and ( 4)-(7) the 
observations consist of Census-designated places. In columns (3), (8), and (9) the observations are on metropolitan statistical areas. 
Subsidized housing "Pressure" is the number of subsidized housing units divided by the number of people that have less than 50 
percent of the median family income. All regressions include controls for the age, racial, and income distributions, and the percent 
married. Columns (2), (5), (7), and (9) include state dummies. 
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Table 11: Does subsidized housing affect the num her of rooms? 
Left-hand-side variable: Rooms per capita Rooms per unit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Occupied subsidized 0.989 0.569 2.917 4.589 0.892 -1.786 5.795 3.661 
housing units per capita (0.119) (0.117) (1.412) (1.801) (0.181) (0.165) (2.696) (2.496) 
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.73 0.89 0.92 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.94 
Unit of observation Place Place MSA MSA Place Place MSA MSA 
Left-hand-side variable: Rooms per capita Occupied housing units per capita 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Occupied subsidized 0.757 0.982 1.432 3.359 0.282 0.308 0.253 0.498 
housing units per capita (0.109) (0.111) (1.248) (1.597) (0.012) (0.012) (0.130) (0.157) 
Rooms per unit 0.261 0.231 0.256 0.336 -0.0143 -0.0202 -0.015 0.006 (0.004) (0.004) (0.032) (0.049) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.003) (0.005) 
State dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.76 0.92 0.94 0.78 0.81 0.90 0.94 
Unit of observation Place Place MSA MSA Place Place MSA MSA 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are OLS, weighted by population. Specifications using census-designated 
places have 22,872 observations and the columns with metropolitan statistical areas have 252 observations. All regressions include 
controls for the age, racial, and income distributions, and the percent married. Even numbered columns include state dummies. 
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Appendix Table A: First-Stage Regressions 
The Relationship Between Preexisting Public Housing or 
Old Rental Stock and Current Subsidized Housing 
Occupied public units in 
1977 per 1990 capita 
# of rental units per capita 
built pre-1940 
State dummies 
Adjusted R2 
Instrument: Occupied public 
housing units per capita ( 1980) 
0.670 0.604 
(0.0 10) (0.009) 
No Yes 
0.56 0.61 
Instrument: Number of 
Housing units per capita 
built before 1940 
0.111 
(0.003) 
No 
0.48 
0.103 
(0.004) 
Yes 
0.55 
Notes : Left-hand-side variable is occupied subsidized housing units per capita in 1990. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. There are 21,237 observations in columns (1) and (2) and 22,872 in 
colums (3) and ( 4), each is a Census-designated place. Regressions are weighted by population. 
All regressions also include controls for the age, race, and income distributions, and the percent 
married. 
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